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Capital gains taxation and shareholder wealth in takeovers 
 
Abstract 
Before December 1999, the capital gains of shareholders who sold their shares into 
Australian takeovers have been taxable irrespective of payment method.  
Subsequently, shareholders can elect to rollover capital gains in equity takeovers.  We 
examine the effect of this change on the association between target shareholder capital 
gains and bidder and target firm shareholder wealth.  The results indicate that prior to 
the regulatory change, cash consideration results in higher target shareholder returns 
for non-taxation reasons.  After the introduction of capital gains tax rollover relief, we 
find that target and acquiring firm shareholders earn lower returns when cash 
consideration is offered to shareholders with greater capital gains. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The impact of payment method on shareholder wealth has been well researched.  The 
conclusion from these studies is that target firm shareholders receive higher abnormal 
returns around takeover announcements when cash is offered as payment (e.g. 
Wansley, Lane and Yang, 1983 and Da Silva Rosa, Izan, Steinback and Walter, 
2000).  For acquiring firm shareholders, prior studies generally find that cash bidders 
earn insignificant abnormal returns, whilst equity bidders have significant negative 
returns (e.g., Travlos, 1987; Bellamy and Lewin, 1992). 
 
Although many reasons have been put forward for why premiums and returns of 
acquiring and target firms diverge across payment method, an explanation that has 
achieved prominence is the difference in taxation treatment across payment methods.  
In the United States and United Kingdom, shareholders are immediately liable for 
capital gains tax when they receive cash in exchange for disposing their shares as part 
of a takeover offer.  In comparison, shareholders who receive equity have the ability 
to defer taxation to the time when they subsequently dispose of the acquiring firm 
shares.1  The basis of the taxation hypothesis is that the immediate taxable status 
where cash is used as payment results in target shareholders demanding a higher 
takeover premium relative to equity bids. 
 
Directly related to the taxation hypothesis is the ‘lock-in’ effect associated with taxing 
capital gains at the realisation point as opposed to when they are accrued.  Taxing 
                                                 
1 The HM Revenue and Customs Help Sheet IR285: “Share Reorganisations, company take-overs and 
capital gains tax” available at: http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/pdfs/1998_99/helpsheets/ir285.pdf provides a 
description of the U.K. taxation treatment of target shareholders.  The U.S. position is legislated in 
Section 368 of the Internal Revenue Code. 
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capital gains only when realised acts as a disincentive for shareholders to dispose of 
shares that have appreciated in value.  In the context of a takeover, target shareholders 
with a higher unrealised taxable capital will expect a higher premium to compensate 
them for realising their capital gain. However, as indicated by Ayers, Lefanowicz and 
Robinson (2003), testing this expectation is confounded by the asymmetric tax 
treatment of capital gains tax across payment consideration. 
 
In contrast to the taxation arrangements in the U.S. and U.K., before 10 December 
1999, Australian shareholders have been liable for capital gains tax on the sale of their 
shares into a takeover irrespective of the type of payment received.  This symmetry in 
taxation treatment across payment method allows us to directly test for an association 
between target shareholder capital gains and premiums, whilst avoiding the problem 
identified in Ayers, Lefanowicz and Robinson (2003). 
 
From 10 December 1999, shareholders that receive equity in an Australian takeover 
may elect to defer taxation until the subsequent sale of the shares received as 
consideration.  Bugeja and Da Silva Rosa (2008) present evidence showing that, 
subsequent to this regulatory change, bidding firms offered cash less frequently to 
target firms whose shareholders had larger capital gains.  This study extends that 
research to examine if the change in Australian taxation treatment of capital gains 
impacted on target and acquiring firm abnormal returns around takeover 
announcements.  Our findings further extend prior research by providing additional 
evidence on the importance (or otherwise) of taxation in explaining shareholder 
wealth effects arising around the announcement of a takeover. 
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We find that cash payment is associated with higher target shareholder abnormal 
returns during the timeframe when there are no differences in taxation across payment 
method.  This finding indicates that the explanation for cash payment increasing 
target abnormal returns is not driven by taxation.  Consistent with the taxation 
hypothesis, we find that, after the change in taxation, target shareholders with higher 
capital gains earn lower abnormal returns when they are offered taxable consideration 
(i.e., cash).  The results for acquiring firms indicate no relationship between payment 
form and abnormal returns.  Similar to the target firm results, bidding firm abnormal 
returns are lower when cash is offered as consideration to target shareholders with 
higher capital gains. 
  
The remainder of this study is structured as follows.  The next section outlines the 
Australian taxation treatment of shareholders and describes previous research relevant 
to this study.  Section 3 discusses the models tested in the paper, whilst Section 4 
describes the sample and presents results.  The final section of the paper concludes 
and suggests areas for future research. 
 
2. Regulation and prior research 
2.1 Taxation of shareholders in Australia 
In Australia, the disposal of shares acquired after 19 September 1985 results in a 
shareholder generating a taxable capital gain or loss under Section 104-10 of the 
Income Tax Assessment Act (ITAA).2  For shares disposed on or before 21 
September 1999, shareholders can index the share’s cost for inflation when 
calculating the capital gain provided that the shares were owned for at least 12 months 
                                                 
2 See http://law.ato.gov.au/atolaw/index.htm for a copy of the Income Tax Assessment Act (1997). 
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(Section 114-1 of ITAA).  For shares acquired after 21 September 1999, indexation of 
the cost is no longer available; however, individual shareholders can reduce the 
capital gain by 50% if the shares at the time of disposal had been held for longer than 
12 months (Section 115-100 of ITAA).  In the case that shares were acquired prior to 
21 September 1999 and sold after this date, the shareholders were able to choose 
between the 50% capital gains tax discount and indexation of the purchase price on 
the proviso that the shares were owned for at least 12 months.3 
 
Prior to 10 December 1999, shares disposed under a takeover offer resulted in the 
shareholder realising a taxable capital gain or loss irrespective of the form of 
consideration received.  From 10 December 1999 onwards, where there is an 
exchange of the same type of interest4 arising from a takeover; shareholders have the 
right to elect to rollover the capital gain until the ultimate disposal of the interest 
received in the exchange.  Shareholders can only make such an election where the 
bidder, as a result of the takeover, obtains at least 80% ownership of the target 
(Sections 124-780 and 124-781 of ITAA).  If target firm shareholders are offered both 
cash and equity, investors can only partially rollover the capital gain.5  This change in 
taxation regulation was introduced after extensive lobbying of the Australian federal 
government and resulted in the government concluding that the previous taxation 
arrangements “were considered an impediment to corporate acquisition activity in 
Australia.”6 
                                                 
3 A summary of these requirements can be found at: 
http://www.ato.gov.au/businesses/content.asp?doc=/content/18427.htm 
4 This requires an exchange of equivalent interests.  For example, shares need to be exchanged for 
shares or a trust interest needs to be exchanged for another trust interest. 
5 The original cost of the shareholding needs to be apportioned to work out the taxable capital gain that 
relates to the cash component of the consideration. 
6 “Capital gains tax: scrip for scrip roll-over – questions and answers” - http://www.ato.gov.au/print. 
asp?doc=/content/18438.htm. 
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Bugeja and Da Silva Rosa (2008) examine whether the introduction of capital gains 
tax rollover for target shareholders in Australian equity takeovers influenced the 
choice of payment method made by acquirers.  Their results showed an increased 
frequency of bidding firms offering equity consideration when target shareholders had 
higher capital gains.  This finding added to the results of previous research in the 
United States that had provided either limited support (Ayers, Lefanowicz, and 
Robinson, 2004) or no evidence (Erickson, 1998) that target shareholder capital gains 
influenced the method of payment choice of acquiring firms in takeovers. 
 
2.2 Method of payment and abnormal returns 
The impact of payment method on target and bidder firm shareholder wealth around 
takeover announcements has been extensively investigated.  Studies from the United States, 
United Kingdom and Canada indicate that target firm shareholders earn significantly higher 
abnormal returns when cash is offered as payment (e.g., Wansley, Lane and Yang, 1983; 
Huang and Walkling, 1987; Franks, Harris and Mayer, 1988; Franks, Harris and Titman, 
1991; Masse, Hanrahan and Kushner, 1991; Draper and Paudyal, 1999).  Consistent 
Australian evidence is provided in Da Silva Rosa, Izan, Steinback and Walter (2000) and 
Bugeja (2005). 
 
For acquiring firms, Travlos (1987) finds that cash bidders in the United States earn 
insignificant CARs over the three days centred on the takeover announcement.  The results 
for equity bidders however are significantly negative.  Similar results are reported by 
Amihud, Lev and Travlos (1990) and Franks, Harris and Titman (1991).  The Australian 
evidence provided in Bellamy and Lewin (1992) shows that cash bidders earn insignificant 
returns on the announcement day, compared to significant negative returns for bidders that 
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offer equity.  Da Silva Rosa, Izan, Steinback and Walter (2000) report similar results, 
however, the difference between announcement returns for cash and equity bidders is 
insignificant. 
 
The differential tax treatment across payment forms has been proposed as the main reason 
for why target and bidder returns differ across cash and equity offers.  In the United States, 
where the acquisition is financed through at least 50% equity, the transaction is “non-
taxable.”  As a result, target shareholders can defer capital gains tax until the shares are 
subsequently sold.  In contrast, cash offers are considered “taxable” transactions with target 
shareholders realising a capital gain or loss at the time of the sale.  As a result of this 
immediate tax liability, Davidson and Cheng (1997) argue that target shareholders require 
the bidder in a cash offer to compensate them through the payment of a higher premium.  
Using U.S. data from 1981 to 1987, they find that, after controlling for the size of the bid 
premium, the form of payment is unrelated to target abnormal returns.  Thus, they, conclude 
that the link between the payment method and the size of abnormal returns is indirect, cash 
bids must be greater to compensate for the immediate tax liability shareholders incur. 
 
The ‘lock-in’ effect of taxing capital gains taxes at the realisation point provides a 
disincentive to shareholders to sell appreciated shares and realise such gains (Klein, 1999 
and Viard 2000).  Ayers, Lefanowicz and Robinson (2003) argue that in a takeover a 
bidding firm must compensate target shareholders for removing their option to continue to 
defer any capital gains tax.  As capital gains tax exposure differs across shareholders, the 
required takeover premium will be that which is required by the marginal price-setting 
shareholder.  As the capital gains tax liability of the marginal shareholder increases, a 
bidder is required to pay a higher premium.  Ayers, Lefanowicz and Robinson (2003), 
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therefore, predict a positive relationship between takeover premiums and target shareholder 
capital gains.  They test this prediction using U.S. data and report a positive relationship 
between premiums and target shareholder capital gains with the association decreasing in 
tax-free acquisitions and takeovers with higher target institutional ownership.  Additionally, 
even after controlling for target shareholder capital gains, premiums are found to be lower 
in tax-free acquisitions. 
 
Owing to the unavailability of individual shareholder data, studies (including the current 
study) investigating the association between target shareholder capital gains and takeover 
premiums are limited to using proxies for target shareholder gains on an average basis and 
cannot assess the impact of the marginal shareholder.  One study not subject to this 
limitation is Landsman and Shackelford (1995).  Using confidential shareholder data taken 
from the RJR Nabisco leveraged buyout in 1989, they show that shareholders with higher 
capital gains deferred their selling decision until there was an increase in the price of RJR 
Nabisco shares. 
 
Considering that prior to December 1999, shareholders in Australia were required to pay 
CGT on shares disposed into a takeover irrespective of payment method, it is possible to 
test for a ‘lock-in’ effect of capital gains on target firm abnormal returns that is not 
confounded by the difference in taxation treatments across payment method described by 
Ayers, Lefanowicz and Robinson (2003).  Furthermore, before December 1999, any 
association between method of payment and the abnormal returns received by acquiring and 
target firms cannot be explained by the taxation of target shareholder capital gains.  We can, 
therefore, test if the association between method of payment and abnormal returns in 
takeovers is driven by reasons other than taxation. 
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The modification to target shareholder taxation from December 1999 is used in this study to 
determine the influence of target shareholder capital gains taxes on abnormal returns.  
Evidence of an adjustment in abnormal returns after the introduction of CGT rollover relief 
would provide direct support to the taxation hypothesis.  Subsequent to the change in 
regulation, target shareholders with high levels of unrealised capital gains will prefer equity 
consideration as this allows them to defer their capital gains tax payment.  We, therefore, 
predict that subsequent to December 1999, target shareholders with higher capital gains will 
experience lower abnormal returns when offered cash consideration as their after tax capital 
gain will have a lower present value than for similar targets offered equity. 
 
The effect of the regulatory change on bidding firm abnormal returns is unclear.  
Confronted with a certain level of target shareholder capital gains, the acquiring firm has a 
choice of offering cash, equity or a mix of cash or equity.  The evidence in Bugeja and Da 
Silva Rosa (2008) indicates the likelihood of a cash takeover decrease as target shareholder 
capital gains increase.  Following on from this finding, acquirers that offer cash to target 
shareholders with a higher capital gain are more likely to face hostility from the target firm 
and/or its shareholders due to the lower after tax return.  If this creates an expectation of an 
increased offer, then acquiring firm abnormal returns are predicted to decrease at higher 
levels of target shareholder capital gains.  Similarly, a cash bid to shareholders with larger 
capital gains may be viewed as having a higher probability of failure.  In this case, the 
acquiring firm’s announcement reaction will then depend on the market’s assessment of 
whether the takeover was a profitable investment for the acquiring firm. 
 
 
 
 11 
3. Model development and variable description 
This section describes the models used to investigate the impact of target shareholder 
capital gains and consideration type on acquiring and target firm abnormal returns.  
The first model we test uses takeovers announced prior to December 1999 and 
assesses if target shareholder capital gains and method of payment influence 
shareholder returns prior to the introduction of CGT rollover relief.  The second 
model is designed to examine if these relationships were altered after the change in 
taxation arrangements in December 1999 and uses takeovers from before and after the 
regulatory change. 
 
Acquiring (Bharbid) and target firm (Bhartgt) abnormal returns are measured by 
calculating the buy-and-hold abnormal return over the two month period commencing 
one month prior to the takeover announcement.  The All Ordinaries Accumulation 
Index is used as the reference market return.  As many of the independent variables 
are common to both models, the variables are described for both models 
simultaneously.  Our discussion of the independent variables has been grouped as 
follows: taxation-related, target firm-related and takeover offer characteristics. 
 
3.1 Taxation determinants 
As capital gains are unique to each shareholder, it is necessary to use a proxy for 
target shareholder capital gains.  For the first proxy, the estimated capital gain liability 
is calculated as the target firm share price 20 days before the takeover announcement 
less the average share price over the previous two years.  This amount is then 
multiplied by the highest individual taxation rate and then divided by the average 
share price over the two years before the takeover announcement (CGPRIOR).  The 
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second measure employed (CGINDEX) assumes that the price-setting shareholder 
purchased their investment two years prior to the takeover announcement.  For 
takeovers announced on or before 21 September 1999, this assumed purchase price is 
indexed for inflation and then subtracted from the target firm share price 20 days 
before the takeover announcement to calculate the capital gain.7  For takeovers 
announced after 21 September 1999, indexation is no longer available so the capital 
gain is measured as the price twenty days before the announcement less the price two 
years previous discounted by 50%.8  These calculated capital gains are then 
multiplied by the highest individual marginal tax rate and then divided by the share 
price two years before the takeover announcement.  Across our study period, there 
was no change in the highest marginal tax rate levied on individuals. 
 
The form of consideration offered is identified using an indicator variable denoting 
pure cash takeovers (Payt).  Prior to December 1999, any relationship between 
payment form and abnormal returns will be unrelated to taxation.9  Non-taxation 
explanations for an impact of payment method choice include the information 
signalling role of consideration type in the presence of asymmetric information 
between managers and shareholders as described by Myers and Majluf (1983).  Under 
this model, the use of equity consideration provides a signal that acquiring firm 
management believes their firm is over-valued. 
 
To highlight any interaction between capital gains and payment form, we interact 
Payt respectively with the two measures of capital gains (CG*Payt).  For model (2), 
                                                 
7 No indexation is applied where there is a calculated capital loss. 
8 Where a capital loss is calculated, we do not apply the 50% capital gains discount. 
9 There may be an indirect tax consequence if target shareholders receiving equity need to sell the 
shares received to pay their capital gains tax liability. 
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we include an additional interaction (CG*Payt*Change) to denote takeovers 
announced after the introduction of capital gains tax rollover relief.  This variable 
should identify any change in target and acquiring firm abnormal returns arising from 
target shareholders with higher capital gains being offered consideration that is 
immediately taxable. 
 
To capture any difference in abnormal returns arising simply because of the change in 
legislation, we include in model (2) a dummy variable (Change) indicating takeovers 
announced after 10 December 1999.  This variable is also interacted alternately with 
the two measures of capital gains (CG*CHANGE) to highlight any change in the 
effect of capital gains arising after the introduction of CGT rollover relief that is 
unrelated to payment method. 
 
Institutional investors include: corporations, superannuation funds and managed 
investment funds.  As these investors are taxable at lower rates than individual 
investors, any relationship between capital gains and abnormal returns may decline 
with the level of target institutional ownership.  This expectation is investigated by 
including an interaction variable between each respective capital gain proxy and 
institutional ownership (CG*TgtInst).  Target institutional ownership is estimated from 
the Top 20 shareholder list released at the financial year end prior to the takeover 
announcement.10  We also include institutional ownership (TgtInst) itself as an 
additional variable to identify any effect that is unrelated to capital gains. 
 
                                                 
10 Similar to Henry (2005), we define institutional shareholders as: life and non-life insurance 
companies, fund management companies, banks, superannuation funds and investment companies.  
Nominee shareholdings are not included unless it is indicated that they are institutional accounts. 
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Ayers, Lefanowicz and Robinson (2003) find that takeover premiums are positively 
related to the target firm net operating loss carry forward.  In Australia, firms can only 
apply prior year losses against current taxable income if they satisfy the “same 
business” or “continuity of ownership” tests (section 165-5 of ITAA).  The continuity 
of ownership test requires that more than 50% of voting, dividend and capital rights 
be owned by the same shareholders from the start of the financial year the tax loss 
was incurred to the end of the financial year that the loss is to be offset against taxable 
income.  The same business test requires that the entity be carrying on the same 
business in the claim year as it was at the start of the loss year.  Carry forward losses 
are collected from the financial statements of the target firm for the financial year end 
prior to the takeover announcement.  The amount of the carry forward tax loss is 
multiplied by the applicable corporate tax rate and divided by the market value of 
equity at financial year end (NOL). 
 
3.2 Target and acquiring firm characteristics 
Stulz (1988) argues that target firm ownership structure is a determinant of takeover 
premiums.  Where the acquiring firm must obtain acceptance from a greater number 
of external shareholders, a higher premium must be offered.  Supporting this 
argument, Stulz, Walkling and Song (1990) show target abnormal returns in the 
United States are positively associated to the ownership of target firm managers and 
negatively related to the bidder’s toehold.  Similar results for the bidder’s toehold are 
found in Australia (Bugeja and Walter, 1995).   To control for target ownership 
structure, the acquiring firm toehold (Toehold) and the ownership of target firm 
directors (TgtDirown) at the time of the takeover announcement are added to the 
models. 
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Following Comment and Schwert (1995) and Schwert (2000), a number of target firm 
financial characteristics are included in the analysis of shareholder returns.  These 
financial characteristics are designed to capture dimensions of target firm 
performance and risk.  Target firm performance is measured using the market-to-book 
ratio (TgtMB) and return-on-equity ratio (TgtROE), whilst risk and liquidity are 
proxied using respectively the debt-to-equity (TgtDE) and current ratio (TgtCurrent).  
Each ratio is measured at the financial year end prior to the takeover announcement. 
 
Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004) examine the returns to acquiring firm 
shareholders in US acquisitions.  They show that announcement returns are 
significantly higher for small bidding firms.  We include the natural logarithm of 
acquiring firm market capitalisation in our regression models to control for firm size 
(Bidsize).  Market capitalisation is measured as at the financial year end preceding the 
takeover announcement. 
 
3.3 Takeover offer characteristics 
Although it is hypothesised that target and acquiring firm shareholder wealth will be 
related to target firm hostility, prior research results are varied. Studies in the United 
States (Cotter and Zenner, 1994) and Australia (Henry 2005 and Bugeja 2005) fail to 
document an association between hostility and abnormal returns.  In contrast, results 
in the United Kingdom show significantly higher premiums in hostile takeovers 
(Franks and Mayer, 1996).  Target firm hostility is controlled by including a binary 
variable in the models signifying takeovers where the initial recommendation of the 
target board is to recommend acceptance (Dirrec). 
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The presence of competing bidders is expected to increase/(decrease) 
target/(bidder)firm abnormal returns.  The presence of multiple bidders is identified in 
the models using a dummy variable coded as one, where more the one bidder make a 
simultaneous offer for the target firm (Multiple). 
 
In summary, the model estimated for takeovers announced before December 1999 is: 
 
BHARi = αi + β1CGi + β2Payti + β3CGi*Payti + β4TgtInsti + β5CGi*TgtInsti + β6NOLi 
+ β7Toeholdi + β8TgtDirowni + β9TgtMBi + β10TgtROEi + β11TgtDEi + 
β12TgtCurrenti + β13Multiplei + β14Dirreci + β15Bidsizei + εi    (1) 
 
To assess any changes arising from the introduction of capital gains tax rollover relief 
for equity consideration, we estimate the following model for takeovers pre and post 
December 1999: 
 
BHARi = αi + β1CGi + β2Payti + β3CGi*Payti + β4CGi*Payti*Changei + 
β5CGi*Changei + β6Changei + β7TgtInsti + β8CGi*TgtInsti + β9NOLi + β10Toeholdi + 
β11TgtDirowni + β12TgtMBi + β13TgtROEi + β14TgtDEi + β15TgtCurrenti + 
β16Multiplei + β17Dirreci + β18Bidsizei + εi       (2) 
 
Both models are estimated separately using respectively target and acquiring firm 
BHARs.  Further, the testing for both bidder and target firms is conducted separately 
for each proxy of target shareholder capital gains. 
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4. Data and results 
Takeovers announced to the ASX for publicly listed firms during the time period 
1996 to 2003 were identified using the Connect 4 Mergers and Acquisitions Database.  
This period includes approximately four years before and after the tax regime change.  
A number of sources were used to collect data required to estimate the regression 
models.  Annual reports for target firms in the year preceding the takeover were used 
to hand collect accounting information and institutional ownership.  Takeover 
documents lodged with the ASX were used to collect information on method of 
payment, ownership of target firm directors and other takeover characteristics.11  The 
Connect 4 Mergers and Acquisitions Database and the Securities Industry Research 
Centre of Asia-Pacific’s (i.e., SIRCA) TIFF Images of ASX announcements were 
used as the source of takeover documents.  Share price data needed to calculate 
BHARs and takeover premiums was collected from the Core Research Database 
maintained by SIRCA.  Abnormal returns are calculated by subtracting the return on 
the All Ordinaries Accumulation Index from sample firm returns. 
 
Takeovers were excluded to ensure a complete data set was available to estimate the 
regression models.  The final sample size is 205 takeovers.  The reasons for exclusion 
of observations are summarised in Table 1.12 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
                                                 
11 These other items include: the recommendation of the target firm board, the toehold interest of the 
acquiring firm and the presence of competing bidders. 
12 The sample in this paper is marginally greater than that used in Bugeja and Da Silva Rosa (2008).  
The main explanation for this difference is the regression models used in this study make less use of 
bidding firm variables.  As such, we were not required to exclude as many takeovers due to missing 
data for the bidder. 
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Table 2 provides summary statistics on target and acquiring firm BHARs and the two 
measures of capital gains.  Panel A and B respectively present information before and 
after the introduction of CGT rollover relief.  Within each panel, the data is 
partitioned across consideration type.  As expected, target shareholders earn 
significant BHARs around takeover announcements.  On the other hand, acquiring 
firm BHARs are generally negative and are only significantly different from zero for 
mixed consideration bids prior to December 1999 and equity takeovers after the 
introduction of the CGT rollover relief.   A comparison of mean BHARs before and 
after the change in taxation for individual payment types reveals no statistical 
differences.  On an overall basis, however, target BHARs are significantly greater 
after the revision in taxation. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
For the whole sample, both capital gains measures are negative both before and after 
the tax change.  A t-test shows that target shareholder capital gains are significantly 
lower before the change in taxation treatment using the CGPrior variable.  Across 
alternative payment methods, average target shareholder gains are generally 
insignificantly different from zero (other than for equity bids). 
 
Descriptive statistics on the variables included in the regression models are provided 
in Table 3.  Consistent with earlier research, target firm abnormal returns are 
significantly higher in cash bids relative to equity takeovers.  Both measures of capital 
gains indicate that cash takeovers are associated with significantly greater capital 
gains than equity bids.  Target firms appear to be unprofitable with mean return on 
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equity being -9.93%.  Target institutional and director ownership are respectively 
10.89% and 11.33%.  Consistent with the findings in Bugeja and Da Silva Rosa 
(2008), equity is used as payment in takeovers when the acquiring firm toehold is 
lower.  This is likely explained by the higher amount of cash required with a lower 
initial shareholding.  Acquiring firms offering equity consideration are significantly 
smaller than those offering cash or mixed payment forms. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
Table 4 presents the results of estimating the regression models using BHARTgt as the 
dependent variable.  White’s (1980) consistent covariance estimator is used for all 
reported t-statistics.  Inconsistent with a ‘lock-in’ effect,’ there is no evidence of an 
association between target shareholder capital gains and abnormal returns either 
preceding or subsequent to the change in taxation requirements.  The results indicate 
that the use of cash payment is associated with significantly higher abnormal returns.  
The significant result prior to December 1990 is explained by non-taxation reasons as 
there was symmetry in the taxation of capital gains across consideration forms during 
this time period.  As the coefficients on CG*Payt are insignificant, returns to 
shareholders offered cash are not affected by the size of their capital gains.  However, 
the interaction of this variable with CHANGE provides significant negative 
coefficients in the period after December 1999.  This result indicates that although 
target shareholders earn higher returns in cash takeovers, after the introduction of 
CGT rollover relief where shareholders offered cash face a higher capital gains 
liability their return is lower due to the requirement to pay immediate taxation. 
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Of the control variables, Dirrec has a significant negative coefficient over the full 
sample period indicating that target abnormal returns are higher in hostile takeovers.  
One potential explanation is that an accept recommendation lowers the probability of 
a price increase by the bidder (Bugeja, 2005).  The significant coefficient on Change 
indicates that target returns are higher after the change in taxation arrangements 
consistent with the univariate findings.  Target directors’ ownership is significant in 
two of the columns.  The negative coefficient, however, is inconsistent with 
expectations.  Of the target firm financial characteristics, TgtMB and TgtROE are 
negatively associated with abnormal returns, whilst TgtDE has a positive effect.  The 
negative coefficient on the market-to-book ratio is consistent with bidders offering a 
lower premium when the value of the target represents growth options as the potential 
for overpayment is higher in these circumstances.  The positive relationship between 
target shareholder wealth and target firm leverage is consistent with the models in 
Israel (1991) and Israel (1992) and the results in Raad, Ryan and Sinkey (1999).  
Target liquidity and acquiring firm size have no impact on target firm abnormal 
returns. 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
 
The impact of target shareholder capital gains on acquiring firm shareholder wealth is 
shown in Table 5.  Once more, t-statistics are based on White’s (1980) consistent 
covariance estimator.  The results indicate no association between abnormal returns 
and either target shareholder capital gains or payment method.  However, subsequent 
to the introduction of the CGT rollover relief acquiring firm shareholders experience 
lower returns when cash is offered to target shareholders with a higher capital gain.  
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This outcome may be the result of offering target shareholders with greater capital 
gains taxable consideration leading to the expected of greater hostility from the target 
firm.  Greater hostility would potentially lead to either to an increased offer price or 
an unsuccessful takeover.  To test if this is the case, we estimated logit models with 
alternately takeover outcome, target board recommendation and an increase in the 
offer price as the dependent variable.  The independent variables are identical to those 
used in model (2).13  The coefficient on CG*Payt*Change was insignificant in all 
models (results not reported) indicating that any perception that offering taxable 
consideration to shareholders with higher capital gains would result in a protracted 
hostile takeover contest is unwarranted. 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
 
Acquiring firm returns are associated with some of the controls for target firm 
financial characteristics with TgtMB negatively related to acquiring firm BHARs.   An 
explanation for this result is that acquiring firms are more likely to overpay for high 
growth targets.  Model (2) shows a significant positive effect of target leverage, whilst 
target liquidity has a significant negative coefficient using both models.  TgtROE and 
acquiring firm size are unrelated to acquiring firm abnormal returns.  The 
insignificant findings for acquiring firm size stand in contrast to the results in Moeller, 
Schlingemann and Stulz (2004).  Target institutional ownership and target carry-
forward losses are both positively related to acquiring firm abnormal returns for 
model (2).  The number of bidders, the recommendation of the target firm board and 
target directors’ ownership do not influence acquiring firm returns. 
                                                 
13 In the model of target board recommendation, Dirrec was excluded as an independent variable. 
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4.1 Additional analysis 
In our analysis of acquiring and target shareholder abnormal returns, we assume in the 
calculation of capital gains that target shareholders have held their shares for two 
years.  To assess the impact of this assumption, we calculate the average holding 
period for each target firm by dividing the number of issued shares at the date of the 
takeover announcement by the average daily trading volume over the prior two years. 
We then re-estimate our results using only those targets where the calculated holding 
period is less than 3 years (approximately 75% of the sample).  The conclusions 
drawn from these revised results do not differ from those presented. 
 
Until September 1999, shareholders who had owned their shares for at least 12 
months indexed the cost of their investment for inflation when calculating capital 
gains.  On September 19th, 1999 the indexation system was removed and was replaced 
by a 50% capital gains discount for shareholders owning their shares for a minimum 
of 12 months.  Since this change occurred only three months prior to the introduction 
of the CGT rollover relief in equity takeovers, it is possible that the results presented 
above are actually driven by the introduction of the 50% discount.  Furthermore, after 
September 1999, shareholders holding appreciated shares for less than 12 months 
would be despondent to receive a cash takeover as they were only a short time period 
away from halving their liability.  Assuming these short term shareholders are the 
marginal investors in cash takeovers they would demand a higher premium to 
compensate them for the loss of the capital gains discount.14  The impact of the 
introduction of the 50% discounting of capital gains is investigated by Hanlon and 
Pinder (2007) in the context of initial public offerings.  They find evidence of an 
                                                 
14 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out the possible confounding influencing 
arising from the move from the indexation regime to a capital gains discount. 
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increase in abnormal trading volume immediately subsequent to the 12 month listing 
anniversary for shares that had appreciated by a greater amount since listing.  This 
result is consistent with investors having higher unrealised capital gains waiting to 
trade until after the 12 month qualification period was met to take advantage of the 
capital gains discount. 
 
To assess if our results are driven by investors with holding periods of less than 12 
months, we change the measure of our two capital gains proxies to a one year 
measure.  The first proxy is re-measured as the target firm share price 20 days before 
the takeover announcement less the average price over the prior 12 months.  This 
amount is then multiplied by the highest individual taxation rate and then divided by 
the average share price over the one year period (CGPRIOR1yr).  The second measure 
employed (CGINDEX1yr) assumes that the price-setting shareholder purchased their 
holding one year prior to the takeover announcement.  This price is subtracted from 
the share price 20 days prior to the takeover announcement and the resulting capital 
gain is then multiplied by the highest individual marginal tax rate.  This amount is 
then divided by the share price one year before the takeover announcement.  We then 
re-estimate model (1) and (2) using alternately each of the re-measured capital gain 
variables.  In the alternative specification of model (2), we re-define the CHANGE 
variable to be the date of change to the indexation system as opposed to the 
introduction of the CGT rollover relief (CHANGEIDX).  These results are presented 
in Table 6 for target abnormal returns.15 
 
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
                                                 
15 The mean values  of CGPRIOR 1yr and CGINDEX1yr were respectively -0.96% and 2.46%. 
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The results on both measures of capital gains continue to be insignificant both over 
the entire sample period and the period preceding the introduction of the capital gains’ 
discount.  Furthermore, the coefficient on the interaction between: payment method, 
capital gains and the introduction of the 50% discount of capital gains, is 
insignificant.  Overall, the results are, therefore, consistent with the introduction of the 
CGT rollover relief changing the association between takeover premiums and capital 
gains and payment method as opposed to the introduction of the 50% capital gains 
discount.  This result is perhaps expected as an investigation of the estimated holding 
period of target firm shareholders indicates that only six target firms have a calculated 
holding period of less than one year.  As such, only a small proportion of target firms 
have shareholders that on average have held their shares for less than 12 months.  The 
results shown in Table 6 for the control variables are mainly consistent with those 
shown in Table 4.  The main difference is that return on equity is insignificant in each 
of the model variations. 
 
We also re-estimated the results for bidding firm abnormal returns using our one year 
capital gain measures and the re-defined change variable.  The results (not presented) 
were broadly consistent with those in Table 5.  The main difference, however, is that 
the interaction between capital gains, payment method and the change to indexation 
was insignificant.  Thus, similar to the results for target firms, the important taxation 
change was the introduction of the capital gains rollover relief in equity takeovers as 
opposed to the change to the indexation system. 
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5. Conclusions and future research 
Dissimilar taxation treatment on the disposal of shares in takeovers across 
consideration types has commonly been proposed as explaining differences in target 
shareholder abnormal returns.  Prior to December 1999, target shareholders in 
Australia were taxable on capital gains irrespective of payment method, thereby 
enabling us to conduct a direct test of the influence of taxation and method of 
payment choice on shareholder wealth.  Inconsistent with a ‘lock-in’ effect, our 
results show no association between target shareholder capital gains and target 
shareholder abnormal returns.  Additionally, we find that cash payment is associated 
with higher target shareholder abnormal returns before the change in taxation.  
Considering that during this timeframe shareholder gains are taxable irrespective of 
the type of consideration, this finding indicates that cash payment increases target 
shareholder returns for non-taxation reasons.  An investigation of these alternative 
reasons would be a fruitful area for future research. 
 
From December 1999, target shareholders can elect to rollover capital gains when 
they receive equity consideration as part of a takeover.  Our results indicate that, after 
this regulatory change, target shareholders with higher capital gains received lower 
abnormal returns when offered cash consideration.  This result is consistent with the 
after tax return for these shareholders being lower than that for equivalent 
shareholders offered equity.  This finding highlights the influence of shareholder 
taxation on target shareholder wealth in takeovers. 
 
For acquiring firms we find no association between payment method or target 
shareholder capital gains and abnormal returns.  Consistent with the target firm 
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results, we document that, after the introduction of the CGT rollover relief, acquiring 
firm abnormal returns are significantly lower when acquiring firms offer immediately 
taxable consideration to target shareholders with higher levels of capital gains.  
Potential explanations for this finding include a perception that such takeovers will 
lead to greater resistance from the target firm board and in consequence result in a 
protracted takeover battle with possible offer price increases. 
 
Similar to most studies investigating the influence of shareholder level capital gains 
taxes, it is not possible to obtain data to allow us to calculate capital gains liabilities 
for individual shareholders.  As such, we are limited to estimating capital gains taxes 
for the average shareholder, as opposed to the marginal shareholder.  These 
limitations must be considered when assessing the findings of this study. 
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Table 1 
Sample selection 
Takeovers announced for ASX listed companies between 1996 and 2003 are included 
in the sample.  The table identifies reasons for exclusion of takeovers from the final 
sample. 
 
 
Takeovers for ASX listed targets announced between 1996 and 2003 435 
Exclusions:  
Bidders not listed on Australian Stock Exchange 194 
Price data unavailable to calculate abnormal return around takeover 
announcement 
 
4 
Target firm does not disclose required information 8 
Offer withdrawn prior to release of target statutory documents 21 
Target firm has no financial information as it is listed in year of takeover 3 
Final sample 205 
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Table 2 
Abnormal returns and capital gains 
before and after the introduction of CGT rollover relief 
The table presents BHARs for target (Bhartgt) and bidders (Bharbid) over the two 
month period commencing one month prior to the takeover announcement.  Target 
shareholder capital gains over the two years prior to the takeover are approximated 
using average share prices (CGPrior) and the indexed share price two years before the 
takeover announcement (CGIndex).  Panels A and B respectively show mean values 
pre and post introduction of the CGT rollover relief in equity takeovers. 
 
 Cash Equity Mixed Total 
Panel A: Pre- rollover 
relief 
    
Number  51 31 20 102 
Bhartgt 20.61*** 7.64*** 12.05*** 15.06*** 
Bharbid -2.47 -2.41 -4.80* -2.91* 
CGPrior -1.44 -11.92*** -2.16 -4.70*** 
CGIndex 4.79 -7.65 -6.14 -1.12 
Panel B: Post- rollover 
relief 
    
Number 50 35 18 103 
Bhartgt 28.78*** 11.92*** 25.10*** 22.39*** 
Pre- vs post- t-test -1.44 -0.27 -1.49 -1.84* 
Bharbid -2.73 -8.92** 1.47 -4.09** 
Pre- vs post- t-test 0.09 1.22 -1.44 0.50 
CGPrior 1.28 -5.14 3.71 -0.01 
Pre- vs post- t-test -0.84 -1.40 -1.02 -1.70* 
CGIndex -2.12 -9.75** 2.99 -3.82 
Pre- vs post- t-test 1.15 0.20 -1.02 0.57 
 
* indicates significance at the .10 level 
** indicates significance at the .05 level 
*** indicates significance at the .01 level 
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Table 3 
Variable means across payment method 
This table presents the means of the dependent and independent variables included in 
the regression models.  A univariate test of differences in means across payment 
methods is also presented.  Variable definitions are given in Appendix A. 
 
 Cash 
(n = 101) 
Mixed 
(n = 38) 
Equity 
(n = 66) 
Total 
(n = 205) 
Cash v 
Equity 
Cash v 
Mixed 
Mixed 
v Equity 
Panel A: Mean for 
continuous variables 
    t-test t-test t-test 
Bhartgt 24.57 18.23 10.21 18.84 3.27*** 1.23 -1.44 
Bharbid -2.45 -1.83 -6.85 -3.70 1.47 -0.24 1.47 
CGPrior -0.10 0.62 -8.27 -2.57 2.81*** -0.22 2.40** 
CGIndex 1.37 -1.96 -8.78 -2.49 1.74* 0.62 1.02 
TgtInst 11.20 13.78 8.72 10.89 1.18 -1.22 2.15** 
NOL 13.91 6.30 16.53 13.33 -0.47 1.92* -1.98** 
Toehold 20.39 17.46 10.40 17.11 3.46*** 0.81 1.93* 
TgtDirown 12.78 6.36 12.00 11.33 0.28 2.35** -1.99** 
TgtMB 1.82 1.30 1.84 1.71 -0.05 1.57 -1.12 
TgtROE -8.40 -1.00 -17.52 -9.93 0.71 -1.46 1.28 
TgtDE 1.17 1.13 3.82 0.99 -0.85 0.15 -0.86 
TgtCurrent 3.90 1.88 6.98 4.51 -1.51 1.66* 2.92*** 
Bidsize 19.91 19.63 18.40 19.38 4.82*** 0.77 3.25*** 
Panel B: Mean for 
binary variables (%) 
    z-test z-test z-test 
Multiple 28.87 25.71 17.74 24.01 1.59 0.36 0.93 
Dirrec 46.39 65.71 46.77 48.53 -0.05 -1.96** 1.80* 
 
* indicates significance at the .10 level 
** indicates significance at the .05 level 
*** indicates significance at the .01 level 
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Table 4 
Association between target BHARs, capital gains and payment method 
OLS regression testing the impact of target shareholder capital gains and payment method on target 
firm abnormal returns around a takeover announcement pre and post introduction of capital gains tax 
rollover relief in December 1999.  The dependent variable, Bhartgt, is calculated as the two month 
BHAR for the target firm commencing one month before the takeover announcement.  Other variables 
are defined in Appendix A.  t-statistics are presented in parentheses. 
 Before CGT rollover(1)  Before and after the change to 
CGT rollover (2) 
 
Intercept 0.2411 
(2.31)** 
0.2957 
(2.91)*** 
0.0054 
(0.05) 
0.0338 
(0.31) 
CGPrior  -0.0501 
(-0.20) 
- -0.0036 
(-0.01) 
- 
CGIndex - 
 
-0.0564 
(-0.48) 
- 
 
0.0786 
(0.71) 
Payt 0.0860 
(2.50)** 
0.1013 
(2.56)** 
0.0802 
(2.09)** 
0.0705 
(1.85)* 
CG*Payt -0.3211 
(-0.95) 
-0.0237 
(-0.24) 
-0.2616 
(-0.98) 
-0.0955 
(-0.87) 
CG*Payt*Change - 
 
- 
 
-0.7747 
(-2.14)** 
-0.6002 
(-1.87)* 
CG*Change - - 0.4800 
(1.45) 
0.3086 
(1.47) 
Change - - 0.0936 
(2.60)*** 
0.0845 
(2.15)** 
TgtInst  0.0605 
(0.43) 
0.0156 
(0.11) 
0.1634 
(1.10) 
0.1490 
(0.97) 
CG*TgtInst 1.1072 
(0.69) 
1.2338 
(1.43) 
-1.0681 
(-0.78) 
-0.6566 
(-0.80) 
NOL -0.0978 
(-0.91) 
-0.1091 
(-1.10) 
-0.0022 
(-0.04) 
-0.0354 
(-0.69) 
Toehold -0.1666 
(-1.52) 
-0.1809 
(-1.59) 
-0.0225 
(-0.21) 
-0.0283 
(-0.27) 
TgtDirown -0.1261 
(-1.09) 
-0.2047 
(-1.79)* 
-0.2380 
(-1.87)* 
0.1886 
(1.60) 
TgtMB -0.0254 
(-2.40)** 
-0.0352 
(-2.95)*** 
-0.0148 
(-1.90)* 
-0.0193 
(-2.99)*** 
TgtROE -0.0171 
(-0.19) 
-0.0430 
(-0.51) 
-0.0386 
(-1.81)* 
-0.0464 
(-2.05)** 
TgtDE 0.0602 
(4.54)*** 
0.0641 
(4.84)*** 
0.0359 
(2.26)** 
0.0413 
(2.55)** 
TgtCurrent -0.0017 
(-0.29) 
-0.0025 
(-0.43) 
-0.0016 
(-0.82) 
-0.0016 
(-0.78) 
Multiple 0.0939 
(1.68)* 
0.0771 
(1.36) 
0.0436 
(0.96) 
0.0440 
(0.97) 
Dirrec 0.0056 
(0.23) 
0.0031 
(0.07) 
-0.0695 
(-1.86)* 
-0.0738 
(-1.91)* 
Bidsize -0.0065 
(-1.49) 
-0.0077 
(-1.40) 
0.0036 
(0.67) 
0.0036 
(0.65) 
F-statistic 2.01** 2.09** 2.70*** 2.50*** 
Adjusted R2  0.1327 0.1421 0.1330 0.1195 
N 102 102 205 205 
***,** and * indicate significance at the .01, .05 and .10 levels, respectively 
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Table 5 
Association between bidder BHARs, capital gains and payment method 
OLS regression estimated to test the impact of target shareholder capital gains and payment method on 
acquiring firm abnormal returns around a takeover announcement pre and post  introduction of capital 
gains tax rollover relief in December 1999.  The dependent variable, Bharbid, is calculated as the two 
month BHAR for the bidding firm commencing one month before the takeover announcement.  Other 
variables are defined in Appendix A.  t-statistics are presented in parentheses. 
 Before CGT rollover (1)  Before and after the change to 
CGT rollover (2) 
 
Intercept 0.2207 
(1.17) 
0.2348 
(1.13) 
0.0100 
(0.07) 
-0.0584 
(-0.45) 
CGPrior  0.1460 
(0.96) 
- 0.1874 
(1.33) 
- 
CGIndex - 
 
0.0786 
(0.97) 
- 
 
0.0654 
(1.00) 
Payt -0.0009 
(-0.03) 
0.0013 
(0.04) 
0.0168 
(0.71) 
0.0104 
(0.45) 
CG*Payt -0.0963 
(-0.57) 
-0.0704 
(-1.06) 
-0.0699 
(-0.42) 
-0.0600 
(-1.06) 
CG*Payt*Change - 
 
- -0.3471 
(-1.72)* 
-0.3262 
(-2.44)** 
CG*Change - - 0.0980 
(0.59) 
0.1194 
(1.35) 
Change - - 0.0097 
(0.44) 
0.0136 
(0.63) 
TgtInst  0.2947 
(1.75)* 
0.2421 
(1.53) 
0.2667 
(2.14)** 
0.2721 
(2.21)** 
CG*TgtInst 1.2403 
(1.05) 
0.8861 
(1.63) 
0.4042 
(0.48) 
0.5364 
(1.18) 
NOL 0.0400 
(0.50) 
0.0386 
(0.50) 
0.1471 
(2.62)*** 
0.1478 
(2.64)*** 
Toehold 0.0360 
(0.40) 
0.0410 
(0.47) 
-0.0491 
(-0.85) 
-0.0392 
(-0.68) 
TgtDirown 0.0735 
(0.75) 
0.0718 
(0.76) 
-0.0081 
(-0.11) 
-0.0102 
(-0.14) 
TgtMB -0.0198 
(-2.49)** 
-0.0329 
(-3.28)*** 
-0.0136 
(-3.19)*** 
-0.0178 
(-3.37)*** 
TgtROE -0.0530 
(-0.96) 
-0.0572 
(-1.06) 
0.0012 
(0.09) 
0.0030 
(0.22) 
TgtDE 0.0044 
(0.56) 
0.0030 
(0.37) 
0.0217 
(2.59)*** 
0.0235 
(2.68)*** 
TgtCurrent -0.0069 
(-2.53)** 
-0.0071 
(-2.92)*** 
-0.0020 
(-1.68)* 
-0.0020 
(-1.74)* 
Multiple -0.0234 
(-0.73) 
-0.0263 
(-0.79) 
-0.0008 
(-0.03) 
-0.0008 
(-0.04) 
Dirrec 0.0016 
(0.05) 
0.0069 
(0.21) 
0.0196 
(0.88) 
0.0193 
(0.88) 
Bidsize -0.0131 
(-1.32) 
-0.0086 
(-0.91) 
-0.0047 
(-0.67) 
-0.0011 
(-0.16) 
F-statistic 1.63* 1.99** 3.00*** 3.20*** 
Adjusted R2  0.0896 0.1337 0.1561 0.1691 
N 102 102 205 205 
***,** and * indicate significance at the .01, .05 and .10 levels, respectively 
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Table 6 
Association between target BHARs, one year capital gains and payment method 
OLS regression testing the impact of target shareholder capital gains over the year prior to the takeover and 
payment method on target firm abnormal returns around a takeover announcement pre and post introduction 
of the 50% capital gains tax discount in September 1999..  The dependent variable, Bhartgt, is calculated as 
the two month BHAR for the target firm commencing one month before the takeover announcement.  Other 
variables are defined in Appendix A.  t-statistics are presented in parentheses. 
 Before the introduction 
of CGT discount (1) 
 Before and after the 
introduction 
of CGT discount (2) 
 
Intercept 0.2138 
(2.07)** 
0.2608 
(2.59)** 
0.0308 
(0.28) 
0.0127 
(-0.11) 
CGPrior1yr  -0.0887 
(-0.38) 
- 0.4387 
(1.64) 
- 
CGIndex1yr - 
 
-0.1184 
(-0.87) 
- 
 
0.0477 
(0.35) 
Payt 0.0938 
(2.49)** 
0.1096 
(2.60)** 
0.0760 
(1.92)* 
0.0945 
(2.38)** 
CG*Payt -0.4979 
(-1.36) 
-0.0114 
(-0.08) 
-0.1743 
(-1.37) 
-0.1560 
(-0.97) 
CG*Payt*ChangeIdx - 
 
- 
 
0.0836 
(0.67) 
-0.1455 
(-1.06) 
CG*ChangeIdx - - 0.0095 
(0.08) 
0.0139 
(0.13) 
ChangeIdx - - 0.0587 
(1.55) 
0.0610 
(1.58) 
TgtInst  0.0497 
(0.30) 
0.0093 
(0.06) 
0.1475 
(0.99) 
0.1324 
(0.86) 
CG*TgtInst 0.5134 
(0.41) 
1.3216 
(0.98) 
-0.4033 
(-0.29) 
-0.4430 
(-0.37) 
NOL -0.0909 
(-0.86) 
-0.1140 
(-1.06) 
0.0143 
(0.23) 
-0.0009 
(-0.02) 
Toehold -0.1256 
(-1.01) 
-0.1549 
(-1.20) 
-0.0122 
(-0.12) 
-0.0305 
(-0.29) 
TgtDirown -0.0918 
(-0.82) 
-0.1518 
(-1.28) 
0.2124 
(1.73)* 
0.1775 
(1.39) 
TgtMB -0.0229 
(-2.21)** 
-0.0324 
(-2.09)** 
-0.0181 
(-2.44)** 
-0.0162 
(-1.71)* 
TgtROE -0.0789 
(-0.77) 
-0.1131 
(-1.08) 
-0.0305 
(-1.55) 
-0.0287 
(-1.35) 
TgtDE 0.0550 
(4.46)*** 
0.0573 
(3.87)*** 
0.0434 
(2.73)*** 
0.0455 
(2.48)** 
TgtCurrent -0.0054 
(-0.91) 
-0.0058 
(-1.08) 
-0.0003 
(-0.19) 
-0.0007 
(-0.35) 
Multiple 0.0408 
(0.68) 
0.0155 
(0.24) 
0.0580 
(1.27) 
0.0496 
(1.04) 
Dirrec -0.0185 
(-0.36) 
-0.0112 
(-0.22) 
-0.0770 
(-1.97)** 
-0.0748 
(-1.93)* 
Bidsize -0.0041 
(-1.04) 
-0.0048 
(-1.27) 
0.0034 
(0.62) 
0.0054 
(0.91) 
F-statistic 1.98** 1.71* 2.55*** 1.83** 
Adjusted R2  0.1436 0.1078 0.1226 0.0695 
N 92 92 205 205 
***,** and * indicate significance at the .01, .05 and .10 levels, respectively 
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Appendix A 
Description and measurement of variables used in this study 
 
Bhartgt: buy-hold abnormal return for the target firm calculated for the two month period 
commencing one month prior to the takeover announcement. 
Bharbid: buy-hold abnormal return for the bidder firm calculated for the two month period 
commencing one month prior to the takeover announcement. 
CGPrior: estimate of target shareholder capital gain liability measured by subtracting from 
the share price twenty days before the takeover announcement the average share price over 
the prior two years, then multiplied by the highest individual marginal tax rate.  This capital 
gain is then scaled by the average share price over the two year period.    
CGPrior1yr: estimate of target shareholder capital gain liability measured by subtracting 
from the share price twenty days before the takeover announcement the average share price 
over the prior one year, then multiplied by the highest individual marginal tax rate.  This 
capital gain is then scaled by the average share price over the one year period.    
CGIndex: for takeovers before 21 September 1999, target shareholder capital gain liability 
estimated by subtracting from the share price twenty days before the takeover announcement, 
the inflation indexed price from two years prior, then multiplied by the highest individual 
marginal tax rate.  For takeovers after 21 September 1999, target shareholder capital gain 
liability estimated by subtracting from the share price twenty days before the takeover 
announcement, the price from two years prior, and then multiplied by the highest individual 
marginal tax rate.  This capital gains amount calculated is then scaled by the share price at the 
beginning of the two year period. 
CGIndex1yr: estimate of target shareholder capital gain liability estimated by subtracting 
from the share price twenty days before the takeover announcement, the price one year prior, 
then multiplied by the highest individual marginal tax rate.  This capital gains amount 
calculated is then scaled by the share price at the beginning of the one year period. 
Payt: a binary variable coded as 1, where the takeover consideration is exclusively cash. 
CG*Payt: interaction variable between Payt and, respectively, each measure of CG. 
CG*Payt*Change/(Idx): interaction variable between Payt and Change/(Idx) and, in turn, 
each measure of CG. 
CG*Change/(Idx): interaction variable between Change/(Idx) and, in turn, each measure of 
CG. 
Change: a binary variable coded as one for takeovers announced after the introduction of 
capital gains roll-over for equity consideration 
ChangeIdx: a binary variable coded as one for takeovers announced after the introduction of 
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the 50% discount of capital gains on investments held for more than 12 months. 
TgtInst: institutional ownership in the target firm estimated at the financial year end prior to 
the takeover announcement. 
CG*TgtInst: interaction variable between TgtInst and in turn each measure of CG. 
NOL: tax loss carry-forward of the target firm at the financial year end prior to the takeover 
announcement, multiplied by the applicable corporate tax rate and scaled by market 
capitalisation at financial year end. 
Toehold: the share ownership of the bidder at the date of the takeover announcement 
disclosed in bidder firm documents lodged with the ASX. 
TgtDirown: the percentage holding of target firm directors disclosed in target firm documents 
lodged with the ASX. 
TgtMB: target firm market-to-book ratio calculated at the financial year end prior to the 
takeover announcement. 
TgtROE: target firm return-on-equity calculated at the financial year end prior to the takeover 
announcement. 
TgtDE: target firm debt-to-equity ratio calculated at the financial year end prior to the 
takeover announcement. 
TgtCurrent: target firm current ratio calculated at the financial year end prior to the takeover 
announcement. 
Multiple: a binary variable coded as one if competing takeover offers are announced for the 
target firm. 
Dirrec: a binary variable coded as one, where the initial recommendation of the target board 
to shareholders is to accept the offer. 
Bidsize: the natural logarithm of the market capitalisation of the acquiring firm measured at 
the financial year end prior to the takeover announcement. 
 
 
